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I intend to criticize Evelyn Pluhar’s allegedly egalitarian ethic, presented in her recent
work Beyond Prejudice, partly by way of contrasting it with what she calls
“perfectionism” and partly by demonstrating that, in fact, her ethic schizophrenically
embraces a defective form of perfectionism. My analysis suggests that knotty animalrights dilemmas are best approached not from a stance of viewing animals and humans as
morally equal but rather from a framework more flexible and adaptive to the complexity
of real-life scenarios. Such adaptability in a theory need not condone cruelty, and it
avoids the unintuitive and absurdly demanding features of a rigid egalitarian perspective.
I. A Day in the Lifeboat with Pluhar, Regan, or Edwards
Pluhar’s egalitarian ethic claims that all “conscious purposive agents” are maximally
morally significant. She includes as conscious purposive agents humans, most marginal
humans, mammals, and birds (granting them the benefit of the doubt) but, conversely,
excludes reptiles, amphibians, and fish.1 The upshot is that an ordinary adult human is as
morally significant as a horse, a dog, or at the extreme, a mouse or songbird. Contrasting
with the egalitarian picture is perfectionism, which Pluhar defines as the view that “the
moral significance of beings increases in proportion to the degree to which they possess
certain capacities or virtues.”2
To illustrate the praxis of these views, let’s briefly return to Regan’s oft-referenced
lifeboat scenario. Four humans and a dog are candidates for occupancy in a lifeboat; there
is not enough room for all, so one must perish. Regan sees the humans and the dog as
equally morally significant in that all possess sufficient attributes to qualify as a “subjectof-a-life,” a moral status intended to grant equal rights to those who qualify. Despite this
egalitarian move, Regan finds it morally appropriate to let the dog die due to the worseoff principle: when rights must be overridden due to conflict, those who would be worseoff by violation of their rights have the conflict resolved in their favor. Since “no
reasonable person would deny that the death of any of the four humans would be a
greater…harm, than would be true in the case of the dog,” the dog is left out of the
lifeboat.3
Rem Edwards gives a commonsensical perfectionist solution to the dog-in-a-lifeboat
dilemma. Contra Regan, Edwards claims there are different degrees of being a subject-ofa-life, degrees that confer different levels of moral status:
Despite Regan’s insistence to the contrary, it seems to me that there are degrees of
being the subject-of-a-life. By degrees I mean that subjects-of-a-life differ
immensely with respect to
1. the complexity of their organization,
2. the extent to which they exemplify the defining characteristics of the notion,
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and
3. the richness with which they may manifest additional traits of subjectivity
conspicuously absent from Regan’s list like rationality, self-consciousness,
moral agency, etc. [emphasis in original].4
Noting that Regan’s solution to the lifeboat problem leads to inconsistencies in his theory
(e.g., it seems to justify fatal experiments on millions of animals to save one human, yet
Regan explicitly bans animal experimentation), Edwards supplies a more plausible
solution:
If I am right…that all subjects-of-a-life do not have equal inherent worth, and if,
as they typically are, the human subjects-of-a-life are indeed much more complex,
intense, and richer in properties than that of the dog, then casting the dog
overboard is justified both in terms of inherent and intrinsic value…it is
unreasonable to suppose that the dog has a right to life that is equal to that of the
humans.5
Hence Edwards sees the dog as less morally significant than the humans based on the
complex correlation of relevant moral factors in the above citation. Pluhar’s egalitarian
ethic, however, leads her to find this route unacceptable. She cannot condone flinging the
dog to the cold waters because its right to life is inferior due to an inferior mental life.
Instead, she adopts a different strategy. Yes, the dog should go, but not because it
lacks maximal moral significance; rather, “If there is not enough to go around for
everyone to make it, those involved have the right to influence the odds in their favor
[emphasis in original].”6 This rather thrasymachian solution morally allows the humans
to get together and say, “Well, gee, here we are in a lifeboat, there’s not enough to go
around, okay, let’s kill the dog,” whereupon poor Fido’s right to influence the odds is
quickly subdued by a simple shot from a 9mm handgun (or a blow from a paddle or
knife). Instead of providing a morally appropriate, egalitarian resolution (like drawing
straws), Pluhar returns to a Hobbesian state of nature where each is at war with all.
This brings up a serious criticism of Pluhar’s stance. Although her egalitarian ethic
supposedly allots equal moral significance to humans and nonhumans, the lifeboat dog’s
right to influence the odds, at least de facto, is much less than the humans’. Pluhar is
selling a harsh version of concealed perfectionism that morally rewards creatures able to
kill most effectively. Intelligence, which Pluhar abhors as a standard for setting moral
worth, becomes relevant with a vengeance. Barring some bizarre fluke of fate, the major
odds-influencing will be done by those who can construct and use various massively
lethal weapons (read: humans). It seems quite an unfair setup for the poor dog (or
mouse!), given that it is allegedly equal in moral stature to a human being.
Lest one think that Pluhar’s thrasymachian qualifier will rarely if ever apply in real
life, consider Edwards’ assertion that “There is a sense, of course, in which planet [E]arth
is a giant lifeboat situation in which some individuals must die to save others,” which
leads him to find such a situation applicable in the case of life-saving animal
experimentation.7 Garret Hardin infuses the metaphor with a malthusian twist in
“Lifeboat Ethics.” Hardin sees the burgeoning human population as seriously
outstripping the food supply and heading toward disaster in terms of purely human
existence, let alone animal. He voices his concern metaphorically:
Each rich nation amounts to a lifeboat full of comparatively rich people. The poor
of the world are in other, much more crowded lifeboats.8

Between the Species III August 2003 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/

3
According to Hardin, we let no one into our sanctuary. We watch the poor starve in their
overcrowded sinking rafts. But getting back to Pluhar, if the world is a big lifeboat or a
collection of lifeboats, and supplies are severely strained and threatening to prove
inadequate (as Pluhar seems to accept9 then animals are out of luck in a big way, at least
given her might-makes-right solution. Even a charging elephant isn’t going to get very far
when it is head to head with a hunting rifle.
II. Pluhar’s Defense
Pluhar barely touches on the problems raised by Hardin and fails to address them.10
However, she defends against the claim that animal organ-harvesting and
experimentation are lifeboat situations by pointing out an apparent disanalogy:
[Regarding a lifeboat situation] the parties involved must both be innocently
caught in a situation where there are not enough resources to sustain both their
lives, although there are enough supplies to support one. Each is at risk; either
could die if nothing is done. These individuals truly are competing for life.
These conditions are not present when we are considering killing [an animal] for
her organs or for other medical purposes…The human and non-human animal are
not each at risk of dying if nothing is done [emphasis in original].11
But by going this route, I think Pluhar must accept some rather unpalatable
consequences. Imagine a husband, wife, and dog on a lifeboat and furthermore imagine
that the husband is terribly weak with little chance to survive if he does not get a share of
the scanty provisions, provisions sufficient only to keep two of the three alive. Now, if
“nothing is done,” the husband will die, and the wife and dog survive (the woman and the
dog are both in good shape). On the other hand, if the husband gets a share of the food,
he’ll probably pull through, though the dog, then, is sacrificed.12 On Pluhar’s reasoning,
the wife cannot kill the dog to save her husband because this case does not constitute a
‘lifeboat situation.’ The criterion that “the human and nonhuman animal are not each at
risk of dying if nothing is done” is not met.
If a Pluharian accepts this as a case where the might-makes-right qualifier applies, we
have a strange situation where it is no less wrong for the dog to kill the woman (and
hence bring about the death of the man, too), than for her to kill the dog. In the latter
case, the husband and wife both live, while in the former only the dog survives, but the
Pluharian is forced to consider both scenarios as equally acceptable outcomes.13
It does seem that the wife-husband-dog scenario is a lifeboat scenario, and it
furthermore seems morally best if the wife kills the dog. The implication is that Pluhar
has not shown animal-experimentation and organ-harvesting disanalagous in a morally
relevant way to lifeboat cases. At least along the lines of the criteria so far considered, it
seems that the case of the wife-husband-dog in a lifeboat is not so different from that of
organ donation where the needed organ is only available from a nonhuman. A desperate
wife looks justified in authorizing the killing of a nonhuman donor to save her sick
husband, just as the wife in the lifeboat assumes a proper though unsettling moral course
when she kills the dog so her spouse can live.
Nonetheless, a disanalogy unavailable to Pluhar is available to a perfectionist if the
organ donor is a baboon or other ape. Many apes have salient attributes that most other
animals lack, such as self-awareness, use of complex tools, rudimentary language
capabilities, and moral behavior.14 Furthermore, DNA similarities between humans and
apes are startling, especially in the case of chimpanzees, who are 98.4% genetically
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similar to us. So, a perfectionist might argue, it is perhaps acceptable to kill a dog in
situations where it is unacceptable to kill an ape, and most certainly organ-harvesting in a
‘lifeboat’ case might be such a situation.
III. Other Attempts
Pluhar attempts to disanalogize organ-harvesting/animal-experimentation from lifeboat
cases in other ways. She notes that the parties involved must be “innocently caught” in
the situation; otherwise, the might-makes-right corollary does not apply:
The continuing practice of killing nonhuman animals for medical
purposes…cannot be painted as a party of innocents trapped in a lifeboat. The
only lifeboat situation that would be parallel to this one would be one in which a
healthy young individual, minding her own business, is forced onto a lifeboat at
gunpoint and made to serve as one’s lunch, organ supplier, or vaccine tester.15
The problem here is that those in need of organ donations (and concerned relatives)
certainly seem innocently caught in their unfortunate predicament; few people
intentionally put themselves in the position of needing an organ transplant! A scheme is
not plotted in advance for the sake of doing away with poor animals.
No doubt, imprisoning animals minding their own business and killing/torturing them
is distasteful, but Pluhar’s self-defense might-makes-right corollary seems to allow just
such activities, despite her insistence to the contrary. She seems to think that the organdonor nonhuman is forced unfairly into the lifeboat, but she draws the boundary of the
lifeboat too narrowly. It is inaccurate to speak of forcing an animal into a (moral) domain
it is already in! And such is the case if the ‘lifeboat’ is, as Edwards claims, the planet
Earth.
The boundary of the lifeboat seems best delineated by the realm in which the relevant
resources are scarce, and given this delineation, it seems most proper to speak of the
lifeboat being the entire globe in the case of organs available for transplant and subjects
available for dangerous medical experimentation. Perhaps sensing this, Pluhar comes up
with another strategy for protecting nonhumans from the use of their bodies to save
human lives:
We could only claim there to be a scarcity of resources if we include the
nonhuman’s healthy, independently functioning body among those resources; by
no stretch of the imagination is this compatible with the attribution of full moral
rights to that animal [my emphasis].16
This assertion, nevertheless, simply begs the question. Whether the animal has full moral
rights is just what is at issue. The same problem plagues the story Pluhar tells about
“Sanchez,” kidnapped by a dying woman who says:
Sanchez, you and I are competitors for a scarce resource: your liver. My liver is
riddled with disease, and I will soon die without a transplant. No suitable cadaver
organs are available, but tests show that your liver would be excellent for me.
Either I will die or you will die: our lives are in conflict. I have the right to protect
my own life, so I am justified in having you killed so that I may harvest your
lovely liver.17
Why does Pluhar tell a story about imprisoning and harvesting an organ from a human
when she wants to demonstrate the wrongness of such treatment for nonhumans? By
focusing on the mistreatment of a human, she wishes to emphasize how horribly one acts
in harvesting from animals. But the problem, of course, is that it has not yet been
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established that nonhumans are as morally significant as humans. Pluhar says that the
dying woman is not justified in taking Sanchez’s liver, “given that her victim has the
same basic moral rights that she does.” But, again, to make such a claim about animals,
without strong argumentation to back it up, simply begs the question. Pluhar, however,
believes that she has such an argument.
IV. The Gewirthian Argument
No doubt Pluhar is relying on her crucial argument, one based on the philosophy of
Gewirth, that purportedly demonstrates the maximal moral significance of all conscious
purposive agents. Although not mentioned in her discussion of why organ-harvesting and
animal experimentation do not count as lifeboat situations, the Gewirthian argument is
Pluhar’s main bulwark in defense of her egalitarian ethic. It is important, then, to
examine this argument and determine its efficacy.
In a nutshell, the Gewirthian argument proceeds from the stance of “reflecting” agents;
the agents realize that to achieve their goals they must have the rights to freedom and
well-being (to have well being one must “be alive, have a certain minimal quality of life,
and have certain basic mental and physical capabilities”).18 Then the agents are driven by
logical consequence to conclude that “all prospective purposive agents have rights to
freedom and well-being.” The follows from the fact that being a prospective purposive
agent is sufficient for the conclusion. As Pluhar says:
The warrant for an agent’s claim to basic (“generic”) rights is very
straightforward: She has purposes she wants to fulfill; that is, she is a “prospective
purposive agent.”19
Pluhar spends a good deal of energy grappling with the Humean problem that the
argument seems to go from an observation of fact (that agents must be unimpeded in
certain basic ways if they are to achieve their goals) to a statement of morality. I do not
want to focus on this issue but rather on some others that arise, assuming that the
Gewirthian argument does succeed in according equal basic rights to all conscious
purposive agents.
A central question is, Does the possession of basic or generic rights necessarily qualify
the rights holder for maximal moral significance? The answer, it seems, is no. First, in
light of Pluhar’s handling of the lifeboat dilemma, it appears humans have, de facto, more
moral significance than nonhumans even though both have “basic rights.” Clearly the
poor dog or mouse is not on the same moral level when humans can use their intelligence
and weapons to bump them out of ‘lifeboats’ (harvest their organs, use them for
dangerous medical experimentation) or eat them in times of scarcity.
Secondly, even granted that basic rights afford the rights-holder a strong claim, it is a
further step to conclude that all rights to what Pluhar calls “necessary goods” (e.g.,
freedom and well-being) are equal in magnitude. Pluhar needs the Gewirthian argument
to demonstrate that all prospective purposive agents have full rights to freedom and wellbeing, if she wants to show maximal moral significance holds for all such agents.20 Not
only does the Gewirthian argument fail to do this, but Pluhar herself, following Gewirth,
notes that some conscious purposive agents do not have full rights to some necessary
goods.21 So, Pluhar is in an awkward position, one brought out in her final subsection
where she claims of conscious purposive agents:
Any such being, human or nonhuman, is fully morally significant, despite the fact
that not all rights held by such beings are the same.22
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It seems fair, not a composition fallacy, to argue that if one’s basic rights are significantly
lesser than another’s, then one is not maximally morally significant. Pluhar’s account is
further complicated by her withholding of positive rights to certain animals, while
keeping them for humans. She’s mighty concerned about the wolf’s right to freedom and
well-being but becomes a consequentialist when it comes to protecting the sheep!23 This
consequentialist strain does not sit well with the deontology of the Gewirthian argument.
It is extremely hard to see sheep as maximally morally significant if we can and should
just let the wolf eat them, especially when one wolf requires many sheep or other prey
animals over the course of its lifetime. Pluhar is in the same tangled web as Regan here,
and as Sartre says, there’s no exit.
Third, the Gewirthian argument appears to apply to any creature that cares about what
happens to it. Pluhar asserts that:
The morally relevant similarity between the reflective agent and others to whom
[basic] rights are attributed is having purposes one wants to fulfill [emphasis in
original].
Stipulating that “all consciously conative beings are goal directed,” she goes on:
So long as [such beings] have desires, even on a very basic level, the reflective
agent will see that they are due the same moral consideration that she claims for
herself.24
But what has not been adequately addressed is the plausible possibility that creatures vary
considerably in the quality and/or quantity of caring/desire with which they pursue their
goals, projects, and commitments. If creatures of type A do not care nearly so much in
intensity, complexity, or richness as B’s about achieving their goals, then—drawing from
the Gewirthian emphasis on desire to fulfill purpose—why should A’s have the same
rights as B’s? In the extreme case, perhaps some persons have no purposes they want to
fulfill (e.g., extreme apathy). It seems to follow that the Gewirthian argument does not
attribute to such individuals any basic rights at all.
The argument becomes stronger when one considers animals that Pluhar excludes
from the domain of full moral worth. Although she denies it, I think reptiles, amphibians,
and fish deserve to be treated as conscious purposive agents. They meet Rollin’s five
criteria of conscious awareness:
Neurophysiological evidence—the presence of a nervous system in an animal—
certainly suggest that these structures perform a function similar to that in
humans. Second, biochemical evidence…The presence in an animal of a
biochemical mechanism that is similar to a mechanism in man [sic] that regulates
some conscious state is evidence for something like that state in the animal. Third,
behavioral evidence—when an animal yelps or thrashes or shows avoidance
behavior in the presence of a stimulus known to be harmful to the animal or
unpleasant to men—that is evidence for awareness in the animal. Fourth, the
presence of sense organs…suggests that the animal enjoys some kind of
consciousness. Finally, we may cite all of the above in the context of evolutionary
theory.25
And a recent article on fish explains that:
The interests of fish…are basic survival interests, shared by many other animals.
This ultimate survival interest is complemented by many others, such as acquiring
food, frequenting habitats to which they are adapted, communicating with other
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fish, and avoiding danger or harm to themselves through behavioral and
physiological processes…fish are sensitive to pain, have memory and are capable
of learning, and are conscious, or aware of, their existence. These interests are no
different from those of other creatures, such as…amphibians, reptiles, birds,
mammals, and humans.26
In light of the empirical and philosophical evidence, Pluhar’s statement that “Fish,
amphibians, and reptiles lack limbic systems, after all, and their behavior is not obviously
emotional” looks pretty weak in support of her exclusion of such critters from the list of
conscious purposive agents (while including chickens!).
Not only are humans as morally significant as mice and chickens, frogs and catfish
must be added to the egalitarian moral community, too. Something has gone wrong, and
that something has to do with the vast differences in the functional capacities and virtues
of various species. Let’s face it, humans have attributes that most nonhumans lack, things
like self-awareness, language use, a sophisticated array of reasoning procedures—
narrative, scientific, and logical—with an extremely wide field of application and
influence. Humans can have goals and commitments like bringing about world peace,
ending hunger, writing a muckraking novel, saving an ecosystem from suburbanization;
in short, our moral, religious, aesthetic, and reasoning capabilities suggest an inner life
qualitatively different from that of many, if not most, nonhumans. And I submit that our
unique power and breadth of evaluative and cognitive skills fundamentally affects our
state of consciousness such that the way in which we ‘care’—in the Gewirthian sense—is
radically different from the ways in which a toad cares or a dog cares about fulfilling its
purposes. On the other hand, a chimpanzee would be much closer to humans in its mental
life and so would belong somewhere between dogs and Homo sapiens.
I do not deny the dog a deep and intense caring, and certainly a perfectionist can grant
strong rights to the dog based on that intensity. But when it comes to saving the dog or a
human, ceteris paribus, like Regan and Pluhar, the perfectionist chooses the latter. This is
not a callous denial of the dog’s ability to suffer and feel; it is an emotionally painful
decision forced by exigencies and guided by a recognition of relevant differences
between a dog’s inner life and a human’s.
V. Pluhar’s Concealed Perfectionism
Given (a) the failure of the Gewirthian argument to take into account types of caring
about purposes and the variations of moral significance suggested by these types
(variations rendered more obvious by the inclusion of reptiles, amphibians, and fish in the
moral community of goal-seeking beings), (b) the strong differences in human/nonhuman
moral worth implied by Pluhar’s self-defense might-makes-right solution to ‘lifeboat’
dilemmas, and the relative frequency of occurrence of such ‘lifeboat’ dilemmas, (c) the
further moral divisions apparent from Pluhar’s attribution of certain crucial positive
rights to humans while denying them to nondomesticated prey species, and (d) her
awkward admission that full moral status does not grant full moral rights and might in
fact give to some creatures significantly fewer rights than others—granted these points, it
appears Pluhar’s theory itself is best described as perfectionistic rather than egalitarian.
Indeed, she even supplies the rudiments of a perfectionist framework when she says
that, offered a choice, one should eat a clam instead of a fish, a fish instead of a
chicken.27 Of course her egalitarian ethic denies that killing and eating a human is worse
than the same treatment for a chicken, for both are maximally morally significant. Pluhar
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might try to claim eating the human is worse due to the pain caused to friends and
relatives, but then she comes dangerously close to sanctioning a sort of speciesism based
on emotional bonds, although she invests a great deal of energy challenging the validity
of speciesism of any sort.28
In the face of the extreme counter-intuitiveness of Pluhar’s egalitarian project, and the
collapse of that project into a concealed form of perfectionism, one is led to ponder her
motives: Why does she cling so adamantly to egalitarianism? The purpose, it seems, is to
protect marginal cases and animals from big bad perfectionists (and others) who, she
claims, offer no moral injunction against exploiting such beings. Pluhar insists that
perfectionism entails some abhorrent consequences:
There are…deeply ingrained “intuitions” that clash with perfectionism and cohere
with the rights view. Do we not…have the “gut reaction” that young
children…are fully morally significant, and should not be sacrificed for our
benefit? Granted, the folks I have termed “normalists,” along with their neo-Nazi
cousins, do not share this conviction…Are we not revolted by the notion of
imprisoning and experimenting upon such humans, no matter how many moral
agents may benefit from such machinations? We are still less inclined to accept
the exploitation of less intelligent humans for purposes of food, sport, or
raiment.29
The practices Pluhar describes are indeed monstrous, but I am at a loss as to why it is
inconsistent for a perfectionist to morally condemn the exploitation/killing of marginal
cases or animals. Positing a continuum of levels of moral standing spanning the animal
kingdom does not rule out the possibility that strong rights to life and freedom, for
example, emerge early in the progression, rights that cannot be overridden by human
desires for “food, sport, or raiment” (though they might be overridden in ‘lifeboat’ cases).
Such a perfectionist account perhaps differs little in many normative ways from
Pluhar’s account, and yet, crucially, it is not so rigid as a proclamation of across-theboard equality handed down from the pulpit of (Gewirthian) abstract rationality. The
world is a complex place, multifaceted and protean in its generation of moral problems,
conflicts, and tangled scenarios. A moral theory must be flexible and adaptive to meet
this challenge. One that is too rigid will often stifle rather than enrich the moral decisionmaking process and in a draconian fashion frustrate intuition, common sense, and good
reasoning. I applaud Pluhar’s effort to protect animals and marginal cases from pain and
suffering, but the best of efforts can be ill-represented in the attempt to express them
philosophically; such is the case when a facade of egalitarianism jars our better
sentiments, while down below hides the basis for gross mistreatment of animals via
appeal to a Hobbesian free-for-all.
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